Séminaire de l'Institut des sciences Cognitives

Workshop "Autism and the Theory of Mind"

18 Mai 2000

Institut des Sciences Cognitives
Amphithéâtre de l'Institut

Journée organisée par Tiziana Zalla et Pierre Jacob (ISC, Lyon)

Chair : Daniel Andler (Paris IV)

10h15/10h45
Pierre Jacob (Institut des Sciences Cognitives, Lyon)
Introduction

10h45/11h45
Vittorio Gallese (Istituto di Fisiologia Umana, Université de Parme, Italie)
"Agency and motor representations: new perspectives on intersubjectivity"

Neuroscience is seeking to provide a biologically-compatible account of the embodied roots of cognition, in the broadest sense of this term. Within this perspective, the functional study of neurons becomes the fil rouge enabling to disclose which are the constitutive mechanisms at the basis of our peculiar way to produce representations. I will focus my attention on one of these mechanisms: action.
The experimental results acquired during the last two decades of neuroscientific investigation have demonstrated the essentially relational nature of the motor system, not only from the -obvious- executive point of view, but also in terms of its “representational” capacities. These results point to a central role played by agency in constituting the model of both the self and of the "world outside". All different aspects of action, from its intention to its execution or observation, are part of a single representation-execution continuum. This continuum provides a unified but at the same time very flexible frame of reference that allows, by means of a process of analogy, to map the non-self onto the self.
The neural mechanisms at the basis of our capacity to “represent” actions will be briefly reviewed. This evidence will be used to discuss a simulationist account of intentional-state attribution and its relevance to autism.
 

11h45/12h         Pause café

12h/13h00
Simone Gozzano (Universita degli studi dell'Aquila, Italie)
"The Theory of Mind and the Origin of Mind"

The "Theory of Mind" hypothesis (henceforth ToM) has been set forth by cognitive ethologists in 1978. After twenty years Heyes (in BBS) has cast doubts on its validity for that matter non-human primates. In my
presentation I insists that it is essential to explore ToM in mute animals because this hypothesis may shed light on the problem of the origin of mind.
 In particular, I think that ToM does not presuppose a folk psychology but a sort of folk behaviorism, the refinement of which may lead to the development of a proto-ToM and then of a proto-folk psychology. Once these two proto-theories are in place, they create a virtuous circle that leads into the development of a complete ToM and the related folk psychology.

13h00/14h30 Pause déjeuner

Chair : Tiziana Zalla (Institut des Sciences Cognitives, Lyon)

14h30/15h30
Elisabeth Pacherie (CREA-Ecole Polytechnique, Paris)
"An executive approach to autism"

15h30/15h45 Pause café

15h45/16h45
Francesca Happé (Social Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Research
Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK.)
"How the brain reads the mind: investigations of theory of mind in autism,
brain imaging and acquired brain lesions"

The ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of those around us is essential for normal interaction and social adaptation.  It appears to be just this ability, ‘theory of mind’, which is impaired in autism - leading to striking handicaps in social and communicative development.  The hypothesis that people with autism are unable to represent mental states has been of practical benefit and theoretical significance.  It may also help direct the search for the brain basis of autism. Recent work aimed at discovering the neurological substrate for normal theory of mind will be discussed, including functional imaging and the study of acquired brain damage.

16h45/17h15
Tiziana Zalla, Nicolas Georgieff  (Institut des Sciences Cognitives, Lyon)
Conclusions de la journée

17h15/ 18h00 Discussion générale